Dаy 2 InstructiоnsWelcоme tо Dаy 2 of the Midterm Exаm. Below you will find the full text of what you wrote on Day 1. You may copy and paste from it freely as you continue working.Your Day 2 submission is what will be graded.Use this session to:Continue writing where you left off.Revise, restructure, or strengthen your argument.Add engagement with sources you did not address on Day 1.Develop your response to objections more fully.Reminder: Your essay should be 800–1,500 words. All original exam instructions and constraints still apply.A note on your Day 1 essay: Your essay raises the right question: does simultaneity matter? However, it doesn't yet use the tools Parfit gives you to answer it. Parfit's branching cases are directly about what happens when Relation R holds between one person and two future continuers at the same time. That's not an analogy to your scenario, it IS your scenario. What does Parfit say identity does and doesn't do in branching cases, and what follows from that for the corporation's claim that each clone stands in the same relation to Sam Bell Prime as a future self? Your Day 2 essay should engage with specific arguments from at least two primary sources. You don't need quotes but try to go beyond general references to reductionism or Buddhism. More importantly, make sure you commit to a thesis rather than presenting both sides conditionally. Day 2 Wrinkle: As you continue your essay, consider the following claim from Parfit: the reductionist view does not entail that we should be less concerned about our future welfare rather it entails that we should be more concerned about the welfare of others. How does this claim bear on the argument you are making? Your Day 1 Writing: In both cases where we determine that the corporations' actions are morally agreeable or wrong, this new case does not change either argument. In the scenario where we agree that the corporation is in its moral right to create and use the clones as stipulated in the original contract, one more, or even multiple clones does not change the outcome. If we originally disagreed with the corporation, I do think that this would obviously be a far greater moral mistake, since now the scenario is using multiple clones.To make a scenario from the text that is similar, we can see the Mars teleportation experiment in which there is an error in the process that makes a copy of the original on Mars, while the original is unchanged on Earth, with both unaware of the other's existence. If we tweak this scenario slightly and make it to where there multiple teleporters receive the copies, and all create a new copy, with now an infinite possible number of clones. I would argue, that it does not change the case if it is two clones living at the same time, or hundreds or even thousands of clones at once. If we say that in the original Mars teleporter case, that because the copies do not interact, and will never interfere with the other, that it is not a problem, as there is not much difference in the different copies than there is in the passage of time. If over time, you are technically different, what difference does it make that now there are two new people. This can easily be transferred to more than one copies. If we have multiple copies across the cosmos, and neither of them will interact or disrupt the other, then this is no different than theoretical different timelines. If I decide to move to New Jersey, then, if there is a multiverse, then there is a different timeline in which I do not move out, or I decide to move to another city. While there is most definitely debate on the existence of the multiverse, it would be hard to argue that a multiverse is immoral. Comparing the Mars scenario to the multiple clones at once scenario, we can show that, while there may be multiple Sams, ignoring the practical issues of keeping them apart, then it is just as if there are multiple timelines existing at once.If we disagreed with the corporation, perhaps stating the inherent deceit of the operation, then we can argue similarly. If a Sam Bell is being mistreated in one universe, and they are just in a different location, then it is still wrong to do so in each different iteration. If the corporation was initially wrong when there is one clone, then in this case, the magnified scale would likely require greater pushback. While the original may have just had the corporation change their policy on clones, this scenario might grant greater punishment, perhaps even the cancelation of the whole company operations. To prove such drastic measures just, we must first prove how to argue the immorality of using one clone at a time. In the case that we say the company is wrong, we must show how the consent may not carry over from clone to clone, while maintaining the reductionist viewpoint. In order to set this up, we can look at how the Buddhists handle the self. When we are handling the doctrine of no self or the reductionist viewpoint, since we are saying that there is no real self, there must be a responsibility to the future you. While some may feel inclined to commit to a shortsighted view of the future given these views, we must create a reason not to throw oneself into short-term pleasures with long-term problems. The solution is to what we owe to other people. Most moral people would agree that we should not use others for our own gain if it hurts the other person, so it follows that we should not hurt our future selves in order to retain a quick dopamine hit. This can apply to the clones in the Sam Bell scenario. If we consider sending someone to work because you wanted to get paid unethical, it can be argued this is exactly what Sam Bell and the Lunar corporation is doing. Since we should not send people to work for us without their consent, we, therefore, should not let the corporation create clones to do the same thing. If we consider this to be wrong, it is easy to say that, now that there are more clones working, it is arguably the company doing more wrong.There is pushback that applies to whether or not multiple clones working at the same time makes it more wrong, or equally as wrong. Since there is no foreseeable future where the clones stop working, is not it just the same as an infinite amount of clones? And if there are infinite clones, and there are two working at the same time, it does not make it infinity plus one, or even if there is always two working, it does not make it infinity times two.If we assume that the process goes on an infinite amount of time, it is easy to demonstrate how there is no real difference in two clones at once, and I cannot find any solid arguments given the time period assumed. The only argument that I can plausibly find is that, at some amount of time, it will end, and there will have been at least one more person exploited and lied to. While I do think that it is more practical for it to have an end, if there is no end, there is no difference, so I must agree that, given an infinite amount of time, there is no difference whether or not there are overlapping clones. If, for example, every time I smoked a cigarette, a person got terminal kidney cancer, it would not matter if I smoked hundreds of times or thousands of times, it would still be an atrocity. But if I smoked one or two cigarettes, it would still be bad, but it would not make me a serial killer. It just comes down to where a line is drawn as to how bad you consider it. Maybe you do consider one to be the same moral equivalence to two or one thousand.In conclusion, while overlapping clones may sound like a tall ask, it does not make much of a difference in the reductionist or Buddhist points of views if you agreed that it was initially permissible. If you thought the original case was wrong, then it could make the case of even greater immorality, but that all depends on how far you are willing to go.
Dаy 2 InstructiоnsWelcоme tо Dаy 2 of the Midterm Exаm. Below you will find the full text of what you wrote on Day 1. You may copy and paste from it freely as you continue working.Your Day 2 submission is what will be graded. Use this session to:Continue writing where you left off.Revise, restructure, or strengthen your argument.Add engagement with sources you did not address on Day 1.Develop your response to objections more fully.Reminder: Your essay should be 800–1,500 words. All original exam instructions and constraints still apply.A note on your Day 1 work: Before continuing, revisit your use of Parfit's fission case (the "righty and lefty" example). Parfit's point in that case is that when one person branches into two, we cannot say that the original is identical to both because the two continuers are clearly not identical to each other. This is why Parfit concludes that identity is not what matters in survival. Consider how this bears on the overlapping clones scenario: if both clones stand in Relation R to Sam Bell Prime but not to each other, what does that imply about the corporation's claim that "nothing has changed"? Make sure your Day 2 essay addresses this tension directly.Day 2 Wrinkle: As you continue your essay, consider the following claim from Parfit: the reductionist view does not entail that we should be less concerned about our future welfare rather it entails that we should be more concerned about the welfare of others. How does this claim bear on the argument you are making?Your Day 1 Writing:as we all know, Sam Bell and his clones are the same person and they carry the same identity, therefor the simultaneous activation of two clones or more won't change the moral status of the arrangement. here are some reasons to why we can conclude that it won't change the moral status of the arrangement. Firstly, they are both serving the same purpose which the original Sam Bell served and also agreed to, if we take the righty and lefty example of Parfits we are going to see that one can become two, A = B, A = C, then B = C, therefore the overlapping won't change the moral agreement. secondly, from a hedonistic perspective if the greater good is to split one person into two to satisfy the demand of helium-3 then we should do that as a necessary splitting or cloning for the greater good.from the Buddhist perspective, there is no soul, if the phycological continuity is what actually matters as Parfit says then overlapping the clones for the benefit of the people and the future Sam bell is what matters the most, if cloning one Sam Bell to benefit the future Sam bell and the company is morally accepted which means there are already two Sam Bells one is on the moon and one is on earth then what is wrong with overlapping a third Sam bell? why will it change the moral status? it is ridiculous how people are going to think that two Sam bells is ok but three is not acceptable even though the two clones are actually doing the work to satisfy the demand of helium-3.Think about it this way, if both clones are working for the future Sam Bell and the Future Sam bell is getting paid then it should be morally accepted, the problem I see that might happen is that both clones meet thinking they are the original Sam Bell, but how is that risk any different from the risk of the first clone finding out he is a clone, that risk is there even if we didn't overlap a second clone along with the first one. another problem I see that we had to lie or trick both clones thinking that they are the original Sam Bell, but is that any different from lying to the first clone and making him think that he is the original Sam Bell not a clone? I don't see any difference at all. now let's talk about what benefits we can get from overlapping two clone simultaneously. Firstly, we get to produce more heluim-3 to satisfy the demand on earth and we are not talking about a bit more we are talking about doubling the production of helium-3 to satisfy the demand. secondly, we won't have to send more people to moon and taking a big risk of keeping them in space and if something happens to them it will cost the company a load of money. thirdly, we will save more time by cloning two Sam Bells simultaneously instead of sending more people to the moon and training them. fourthly, assuring that the job is going to be done since the original (prime) Sam Bell already served his three years with no issues and he knew what he was doing, therefore the clones are going to do the work just like the prime Sam Bell did. Lastly, Prime Sam Bell will get paid more since two of him are working simultaneously on the moon.